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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CONTRACTS
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS
T HERE is only one way to record accurately the progress of
any branch of the law over a period of time; that is to review
all of the cases and statutes affecting it that have been litigated or
enacted during the period. This includes all of the cases in the
minor courts as well as those in the courts of appeal, unless we
arbitrarily limit our subject matter to the work of the higher
courts. It is not desirable to fix such a limit.
It would be quite possible also, and reasonable as well, to in-
clude in our review the work of arbitrators, executives, and ad-
ministrative boards and commissions; for undoubtedly all these
have some judicial and law-making functions. Having included
all these, it would seem logical to go further and to record the
practices and activities of individual men; for it is these that create
and apply the mores on which what we call law is based and by
which our progressive judicial action and legislation are deter-
mined.
From this it appears that a review of the progress of the law may
be made to include every individual action of every individual man,
woman, and child during the selected period. It is, indeed, this
great multitude of individual actions and transactions of innumer-
able human beings that constitute life and human progress along
the corridor of time. They form the basis and subject matter of
all generalization, of all "laws" or rules of human action. Each
statement of a "rule" of law is a generalization drawn from this
seething, pulsing background of life. A report on the progress
of the law, therefore, is a report on the changing generalizations
required by the changes in this huge, amorphous background of
action and transaction.
We are in the habit of thinking of these actions and transactions
as being directed and determined by" rules ". If this were wholly
true, there would be no progress of the law to report. But the
fact is that there are no absolute and antecedent rules, governing
human action, that are known to man. The mighty river of ac-
tions and transactions determines and changes its own banks.
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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
This constitutes an evolution, a progress, of man and his "law"
that can be reviewed and restated.
It must not be inferred from this that there are no rules or prin-
ciples, no "law ", that can be stated and reviewed. There is a
river of life that flows, that maintains a reasonably consistent
course. It can be traced and described. Useful and reasonably
accurate generalizations can be made that record the past course
of the stream and that forecast, with a good degree of depend-
ability, its course in the future. But the forecast must always fail
in some degree. The stream meanders; and the future varies from
the past. It is this meandering, this variation, that is presented by
a review of the progress of the law. The fact that the forecast
fails at the points of change does not show that forecasts are al-
ways false and misleading. On the contrary, they constitute our
only guide. They are the light of experience and the sole basis of
wisdom. The generalizations that we draw are the working rules
by which we live. It is these "working rules" that constitute the
whole of our law. Never wholly accurate and dependable, they are
nevertheless the guides by which the judge makes decisions and the
lawyer gives advice. A review of the progress of the law is a re-
view of these working rules.
There is a vast difference in the soundness and accuracy of the
generalizations, the major premises, articulate or inarticulate, that
judges make and use in the process of decision and that lawyers
use in advising a client. This means no more than that there is
a vast difference in judges and in lawyers and law writers, in their
intellectual power, their knowledge of the living stream, their ex-
perience in human life. Some accept generalizations of others,
at secondhand or thirdhand or worse, generalizations of men
even weaker than themselves. Others decide and advise by in-
stinct and "hunch ", their generalizations being mainly inarticu-
late, or even subconscious. Here, as in all other fields of life, it
pays to employ the best and the rarest, the man who knows books
but also knows their limitations, the man who has accumulated an
understanding experience but realizes how incomplete that ex-
perience must be, the man who may advise upon a "hunch " but
whose hunches are based upon his own actual experience in life and
upon the recorded experience of others.
There have indeed been changes in the stated rules of law in
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CONTRACTS
the field of contracts in the last fifty years; that is to say, there are
differences between the generalizations that were formerly drawn
and those that must now be drawn from the judicial decisions and
business practices and human customs of the period. There will
be similar, and perhaps more extensive, changes in the next fifty
years. The past seems not wholly to determine the future; or,
if it does, no jurist or adviser is capable of knowing all of the ele-
ments of the past that are influential in determining the future.
This is the reason that we can never attain that "paradise of
justice ", that "solid land of fixed and certain rules ", of which
Judge, later Mr. Justice, Cardozo wrote in 192 I in The Nature of
the Judicial Process. This is why the law must forever continue
to be stated and restated, becoming in the process ever more com-
plex and more difficult of mastery by a student or a judge. This is
why the American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law of Con-
tracts does not contain the last, the perfect, and the unchangeable
word and rule and principle. If any reporter or adviser or mem-
ber of the Institute has thought otherwise, he must be included
among the blind who attempt to lead the blind. That Restate-
ment does not crystallize or embalm the living law so that it shall
be thereafter dead. It is merely a new statement of what a num-
ber of men, of some degree of expertness, think is now the proper
generalization to be drawn from the past and used to predict and
to influence the future.
This "Restatement" is perhaps the best evidence of some of
the more important changes in the law of the last fifty years. At
all events, it may be useful to call attention here to some of the
changes that the Restatement indicates, changes that must be
evident to any student who carefully compares it with the previous
treatises and articles of law writers, even of those very writers
who composed the committee that constructed the Restatement.
IRREVOCABLE OFFERS
Prior to fifty years ago, it was often said that all offers must of
necessity remain revocable at the will of the offeror until an
effective acceptance is made. "An irrevocable offer is a legal im-
possibility." But it has been discovered that "impossible" is a
large word, the applicability of which is constantly decreasing.
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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
The older view was dependent on the idea that all contracts are
expressions of the will of the parties and that the will is not subject
to judicial control. Carried to its logical conclusion, this idea
would equally result in a rule that each of the parties would have
control of the obligation after acceptance as well as before. The
truth is that it is the will of others, not the will of the contractors,
that determines the legal relations that are consequent upon all
the facts of life, including our voluntary expressions of assent.
Others may not be able to control my will; but they can control
my action, and the processes of enforcement are not at all de-
pendent upon the state of my mind. Therefore, since enforcement
has always been granted, in spite of a change of mind by the offeror
that takes place after acceptance, it can be granted with equal
effectiveness in spite of his change of mind before any acceptance.
Whether such enforcement should or should not be made available
is a mere question of social policy, determined as in the case of all
other rules of law by the mores of the community -by notions
of practical convenience and by business practice and custom.
The Restatement recognizes at least three sets of circumstances
under which an offer may be irrevocable. An offer that makes ac-
ceptance consist of non-promissory action, the resulting contract
to be described as "unilateral ", is declared in Section 45 to be-
come in itself a contract as soon as the requested action is "given
or tendered ". Such contract, however, is further declared to be
"conditional on the full consideration being given or tendered
within the time stated in the offer, or, if no time is stated therein,
within a reasonable time ". The meaning and effect of this are
in no way different from those of a rule stating that the offer shall
be irrevocable after the requested action is begun or tendered.
The beginning of action by the offeree deprives the offeror of his
power to revoke, making his expression of a change of mind quite
inoperative to prevent enforcement. The offeree's power to ac-
cept is a continuing power, in spite of a notice of revocation.
Likewise, under Section 46, an offer "cannot be terminated" if
the promise contained in it has been made binding by a seal or a
consideration, even though the duty created thereby is still con-
ditional upon an expression of acceptance by the other party. This
is merely what is commonly called a" binding option ". It creates
an irrevocable power in the offeree. And, thirdly, under Section
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CONTRACTS
47, an offer is made irrevocable if the offeror has made a " collateral
contract" not to revoke it.
These rules represent a definite evolution in the popular and the
judicial notions as to offers -a development of new law. As
worded by the Institute, there is no doubt that they leave openings
for a conflict of interpretation and application. So do all other
rules, however worded or by whomsoever stated or enacted. They
do not and cannot prevent further evolution and development,
just as in the past. Further, it goes without saying that courts can
repudiate them outright, if they feel so inclined; but they will
not feel so inclined if the rule as stated is substantially in harmony
with common practice and prevailing mores.
THE CONSIDERATION DOCTRINE
In the courts, the doctrine of consideration has gone its accus-
tomed course. This course has involved an assumption that the
term consideration has a simple and uniformly applied definition,
that such a consideration is indispensable to the enforcement of
any informal promise, and that the court's only function is one of
deductive reasoning. The assumption has always been false; the
existence of consideration as defined by anybody has never been
totally indispensable; and the principal function of the courts
is not deductive, but is, instead, the determination of whether or
not there is good reason for enforcing the promise sued on -a
question of social policy.
The American Law Institute chose to adopt a definition of con-
sideration that is markedly narrower than the prevailing usage of
the term by courts and people in general.' By the chosen defini-
tion, consideration for a promise is something that is bargained
for and given in exchange for the promise. This " something" is,
indeed, very liberally defined. It is no longer required to be given
by the promisee, but may be given by a third party. It is no longer
required to be a" detriment to the promisee" or a " benefit to the
promisor ". Instead, it is declared that "gain or advantage to the
promisor or loss or disadvantage to the promisee . . . do not
affect the sufficiency of consideration .2 It may be an act, a for-
bearance, a promise, or any change in legal relations; but in any
1937]
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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
case it must be "bargained for and given in exchange for the
promise ". Such a definition as this excludes all "past considera-
tions ", all merely moral obligations that some preexisting trans-
action has created, and also many subsequent actions by the prom-
isee in reliance on the promise.
This shows clearly enough that the definition, although much
like that of Mr. Justice Holmes,' is not in accord with the common
usage of courts. According to judicial opinions, there are many
past transactions, never bargained for by the promisor, that are
sufficient to make his promise binding. Also, there are very many
cases that hold that a promise may become binding by reason of
action by the promisee in reliance on the promise, even though such
action was never bargained for by the promisor. Also, in a con-
siderable number of states, a preexisting moral obligation is a
sufficient reason for the enforcement of a subsequent promise to
perform it. All of these various reasons for enforcing the promise
are almost universally called " consideration" and are held to be
sufficient to make the promise binding.
The fact is that the function of the courts is not to create a defi-
nition and a rule and then to apply them mechanically and dog-
matically by a process of severe deductive logic; instead, it is to
determine whether a sound and sufficient reason exists for the en-
forcement of the promise. When the court finds such a reason, it
cheerfully calls it a sufficient consideration. The real question
for the courts is what promises shall be enforced, hot what is a
sufficient consideration. The Law Institute recognized that it
must state rules that would show what promises are enforceable
even though there is no consideration as narrowly defined in the
Restatement. The result is that there are ten sections under the
topical heading "Informal Contracts without Assent or Con-
sideration ". To the present writer, it seems certain that these ten
sections fail to include several sorts of cases in which the courts
are finding sufficient reason for enforcing an informal promise.
In a goodly number of States, including such populous ones as
New York and Pennsylvania, it has been held that a preexisting
moral obligation (or a previous action creating such a moral obli-
3 See Wisconsin & Mich. Ry. v. Powers, i91 U. S. 379, 386 (i9o3); Martin v.
Meles, 179 Mass. 114, 6o N. E. 397 (I90I).
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CONTRACTS
gation) is a sufficient consideration for a promise to perform it.4
It may well be that the Institute was correct in refusing to state
a rule in accord with these decisions. There is more difficulty in
defining moral obligation than in defining consideration; and the
decisions do not enable us to determine what kind and degree of
moral obligation it takes to make a promise legally enforceable.
At the same time, those decisions contrary to the Restatement rule
cannot safely be ignored by the lawyers of other states, where a
court may at any time adopt the doctrine and hold that a preexist-
ing moral obligation is a sufficient reason for enforcing a promise
to perform it, whether it is called a "consideration" or not.
Originally, the policy of the Institute in narrowing the defini-
tion of consideration to a bargained-for exchange seemed unsound.
It certainly will be difficult to induce judicial tongues and pens to
adhere to it. But further thought leads to approval of the defini-
tion, when it is accompanied by the definite assertion that many
informal promises are enforceable without any consideration at
all. This tends to free the judicial mind from the shackles of
mere deductive logic and directs attention to the much more im-
portant judicial function of determining sound policy on the basis
of mores and prevailing custom. The occasional maverick whom
this leads to think that he is wiser than the past and can determine
justice at his own free will can safely be disregarded. The mores
are more flexible than is deductive logic; but their eventual re-
sistance overcomes even a revolution. This logic never did.
Among the informal promises that are declared by the Institute
to be binding without any consideration are those covered by Sec-
tion 90 of the Restatement. This reads as follows: "A promise
which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or
4 See the recent case of Webb v. McGowin, 168 So. 196, xgg (Ala. 1936), in
which both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of Alabama found a
sufficient consideration and enforced the promise. The plaintiff had sacrificed him-
self, at the cost of an injury resulting in total disability, in order to save the
defendant's testator from death. In recognition of a moral obligation, the testator
promised to pay to the plaintiff the sum of $15 every two weeks during the re-
mainder of his life. The testator's executor was held bound to continue the pay-
ment. The moving reason was that there had been a substantial benefit to the
person of the promisor. The court excluded moral obligations that are solely
"based upon some refined sense of ethical duty without material benefit" to the
promisor. Id. at 199. See also Medberry v. 01covich, 6o P.(2d) 281 (Cal. r936),
aF'g 59 P.(2d) 5si (Cal. 1936).
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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of
the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is
binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise." At the meeting of the Institute at which this section was
presented, attacks upon it were made by several members. Never-
theless, it was approved by a very large majority. The objectors
were chiefly law teachers who had been taught a different rule
when they were law school students and who were continuing to
teach others as they themselves had been taught. The present
writer believes that the rule is substantially in harmony with judi-
cial decisions going back to the very origin of the action of assump-
sit. If this belief is correct, the rule is not a new development.
But its statement in the present form is not in harmony with the
supposed rule that all informal promises require consideration.
That it is in harmony with very many actual decisions and with
the instinctive reactions of the judges is indicated by the readiness
with which the courts have already seized upon the section and
used it as the major premise of their decisions in recent cases.'
It has long been supposed that the performance of an already
existing legal duty is not a sufficient consideration for a promise,
even though it is bargained for by the promisor and is actually
given as the agreed exchange for the promise. Treatises on con-
tracts so stated the rule and declared it to be applicable even in
cases where the existing duty was a duty to some third person
other than the promisor. The rule was supposed to be in harmony
with prevailing notions of social policy. It may, therefore, come
as a surprise that the Institute declares in Section 84 that "Con-
sideration is not insufficient because of tht fact . . . (d) that the
party giving the consideration is then bound by a contractual or a
quasi-contractual duty to a third person to perform the act or
forbearance given or promised as consideration . . . ." But there
were some decisions, even prior to fifty years ago, that were in
E.g., Callan v. Andrews, 48 F.(2d) 11S (C. C. A. 2d, 1931); Porter v. Com-
missioner, 6o F.(2d) 673 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932); James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros.,
64 F.(2d) 344 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933) (REsTATamENT cited and distinguished);
Greiner v. Greiner, 131 Kan. 760, 293 Pac. 759 (1930); Anderson v. Truitt, 158
Md. 193, 148 AtI. 223 (1930); Lusk-Harbison-Jones, Inc. v. Universal Credit
Co., 164 Miss. 693, 145 So. 623 (1933); Saunders v. Galbraith, 40 Ohio App. I55,
178 N. E. 34 (193i); Union Trust Co. v. Long, 309 Pa. 470, x64 At]. 346 (1932);
Langer v. Superior Steel Corp., Io5 Pa. Super. 579, 161 Atl. 57i (1932).
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CONTRACTS
harmony with the rule stated in this section. Some modern de-
cisions support it, although in some of them there is a specious
attempt to reconcile the decision with the older rule.' Here is an
instance in which the authority of the Restatement may be enough
to resolve the conflict in favor of the rule stated therein.
CONTRACTS UNDER SEAL
The sanctity of formal contracts under seal has to some degree
been modified in recent years; but it is far from extinct.7 The
effectiveness of sealing and delivery as one of several substitutes
for consideration has long since ceased to be based upon the sup-
posed solemnity of the transaction or upon vestiges of superstitious
fear. Probably it now survives largely because it serves as a
method by which a gratuitous promise can be made binding. How-
ever much we may be attached to the doctrine of consideration
and there is no doubt that it serves a very useful purpose and ex-
presses a nearly universal feeling -at the same time there is a
desire that certain gratuitous promises shall be enforceable.
Doubtless, the seal is a clumsy expedient, one that does not in
itself select the good promises from the bad; but its long history
gives it a workability that new devices do not have. In states that
have abolished the common-law effect of a seal, there is some
tendency to adopt legislation making written promises enforceable
without any consideration. A uniform act to this effect has been
proposed by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and has
been adopted in Pennsylvania.'
6 E.g., Sasso v. K. G. & G. Realty & Const. Co., 98 Conn. 57i, x2o AtI. i58
(1923), (1923) 33 YALE L. J. 78; Blakeslee v. Water Comm'rs, 1o6 Conn. 642, 139
AtI. io6 (1927). In these two cases, the court deals with a preexisting contractual
duty owed by the promisee to the promisor himself, not to a third party.
7 In Well v. Poulsen, 121 Conn. 281, 184 Atl. 580 (1936), the court held that
under New York law a contract under seal cannot be modified by a subsequent
contract not under seal, so long as the latter contract remains entirely executory.
The American Law Institute states the contrary as the generally existing law.
See RESTATE ENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 407, comment c. The New York legis-
lature passed an act in 1935 which seems to have the purpose of making fully effec-
tive an unsealed written contract that modifies a previous contract under seal.
N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 342.
8 PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 33, § 6.
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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARIES
There has been rapid development of the law with respect to
contracts for the benefit of third persons, all of it in the direction
of recognition that such third persons have enforceable rights
under the contract. Fifty years ago, there was strong criticism
of such a doctrine, especially in cases where the third person is
a creditor of the promisee and the contract is an undertaking by
a promisor to discharge the duty owed by the promisee to such
creditor. In New York the right of such a creditor had been en-
forced in the leading case of Lawrence v. Fox,9 the reasoning of
the judges being not altogether harmonious. In several subse-
quent cases, the New York court attempted to narrow the appli-
cation of the rule to facts exactly parallel to those in Lawrence v.
Fox, declaring that no contract for the benefit of a third person is
enforceable unless the performance promised will discharge "a
legal or equitable duty" owed by the promisee to the third per-
son. Such a limitation denies a right to a donee beneficiary; it
could not fail to give serious dissatisfaction. The New York
Court of Appeals has rendered numerous decisions in substantial
conflict with it, and has all but repudiated it in express words.'"
A rule that would deny an enforceable right to most beneficiaries
of life insurance policies could not long prevail.
In several states the courts continued to say that "privity" of
contract was necessary for enforcement, either in all cases, or in
specified classes of cases, or in creditor beneficiary cases as op-
posed to those in which the beneficiary was a donee. Michigan
denied the right in all cases; and then came the "hard cases"
that began to make good law -at least, new law." The court
9 2c N.Y. 268 (i89).
10 See especially Buchanan v. Tilden, i58 N. Y. 1og, 52 N. E. 724 (1899);
Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N. Y. 233, 120 N. E. 639 (igi8); Morgan v. Sanborn,
225 N. Y. 454, 122 N. E. 696 (i919); Croker v. New York Trust CO., 245 N. Y.
17, 156 N. E. 81 (1927); McCare v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 266 N. Y.
371, r95 N. E. ig (1935).
11 See the following cases: Preston v. Preston, 205 Mich. 646, 172 N. W. 37,
(i9'9), aff'd on rehearing, 207 Mich. 68i, 175 N. W. 266 (I919); Bassett v. Ameri-
can Baptist Pub. Society, 215 Mich. 126, 183 N. W. 747 (1921); Clark Memorial
Masonic Ass'n v. Colman's Estate, 222 Mich. 599, 193 N. W. 219 (1923); Jones v.
Ireland, 225 Mich. 467, 196 N. W. 369 (1923); Smith v. Thompson, 250 Mich.
302, 23o N. W. 156 (I93O).
[Vol. 50
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CONTRACTS
finally decided that the donee beneficiary of a contract can main-
tain a "bill in equity" to enforce it. It seems probable that it will
before long reach the same result in creditor beneficiary cases,
even though recent cases have held that such a beneficiary cannot
maintain an action "at law ".=
To hold that a third party has an enforceable right "in equity ",
even though he has not" at law ", is to win the whole battle, so far
as the substantive law of rights and duties is concerned. The
plaintiff's juristic right against the promisor is recognized and
enforced, without requiring any "privity ". But the plaintiff's
lawyer must make sure that he uses the equitable terminology and
follows the proper procedure.
Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania have also been
supposed to deny rights to the third person, with a less degree of
truth than in the case of Michigan. Massachusetts is able to find
an artificial "privity"; "3 and it has also recognized enforceable
rights "in equity "."4 Connecticut early allowed a donee bene-
ficiary to maintain suit at law. Next it held that a creditor bene-
ficiary had a right in equity; and finally the uniform civil action
under the code seems to be fully available to him.'" Pennsylvania
consistently maintained two inconsistent lines of decisions, for
more than one hundred years. 6 It is unsafe to say that this in-
consistency has as yet been wholly eradicated. The history that
gets written into law reports remains there, ready to influence
12 E.g., George Realty Co. v. Gulf Ref. Co., 275 Mich. 442, 266 N. W. 411
(1936).
13 Gardner v. Denison, 217 Mass. 492, ioS N. E. 359 (1914).
14 Forbes v. Thorpe, 209 Mass. 570, 95 N. E. 955 (i9ii). In Grime v. Borden,
x66 Mass. 198, 44 N. E. 216 (1896), and Boyden v. Hill, x98 Mass. 477, 85 N. E.
413 (i9o8), the court made use of the theory that the promisee had contracted as
the "trustee" or "agent" of the third person. In a recent decision, the court
has denied recovery to the beneficiary of a nonstatutory surety bond. Central
Supply Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 273 Mass. 139, 173 N. E. 697 (1930).
But there is a statute creating rights in laborers and materialmen on a public
contractor's surety bond. MAss. GEN. LAws (1932) C. 30, § 39. Of course, the
beneficiaries of life insurance policies are not denied a remedy.
1 Baurer v. Devenis, 99 Conn. 203, 121 AtI. 566 (1923); Byram Lumber &
Supply Co. v. Page, io9 Conn. 256, 146 Atl. 293 (1929) ; Schneider v. Ferrigno, iio
Conn. 86, 147 Atl. 3o3 (1929); Tarcyak v. Bakasis, 182 Atl. 406 (Conn. 1936);
see Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons in Connecticut (1922)
31 YALE L. J. 489.
16 The two lines of cases are reviewed by Corbin, Third Party Beneficiaries in
Pennsylvania (1928) 77 U. OF PA. L. REv. 1, 16.
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the future, in spite of attempts at modification, either judicial or
legislative, and even in spite of a dogmatic "overruling". In
several recent cases, the Pennsylvania court has given judgment
in favor of third persons, influenced by the general stream of de-
cisions elsewhere and by the American Law Institute "Restate-
ment ,.
The Institute has flatly taken a position in favor of beneficiaries,
both creditor and donee."5 This action is thoroughly justified by
the flood of decisions; and it should have the effect of eliminating
such conflict as still remains, along with much of the confusion in
reasoning that plagues our legal system and immensely increases
the amount and the cost of litigation. Consider the amount of
litigation on contractors' surety bonds alone, bonds in which a
surety makes an express promise to an owner that a building con-
tractor will pay his laborers and materialmen. Several of the
recent Pennsylvania cases are of this sort; and they gave judg-
ment to the beneficiaries,19 in disregard of previous decisions to
the contrary. The great majority of decisions elsewhere are also
in favor of the beneficiary."0 Yet the surety companies continue to
fight these cases through the courts of last resort; and the cost
to the community of finding out what is "the law" is tremendous.
It is in cases like this that the work of the Institute, if properly
done, ought to have the effect of simplifying the administration of
justice and making it less costly.
Of course, formal Restatements cannot avoid the litigation that
turns on the question of interpretation of the variable words in
surety bonds and other contracts. But builders' bonds have been
in large measure standardized; and much of the constant litigation
17 Portland Sand & Gravel Co. v. Globe Indemnity Co., 3oi Pa. 132, 151 Atl.
687 (1930); Washington Steel Form Co. v. North City Trust Co., 308 Pa. 351,
162 AtI. 829 (1932); Concrete Products Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 310
Pa. i8, r65 At]. 492 (I933); Commonwealth v. Great American Indemnity Co.,
312 Pa. 183, 167 At]. 793 (1933).
18 See RESTATizENT, CoNTuRcTs (1932) §§ 133-47.
19 Washington Steel Form Co. v. North City Trust Co., 308 Pa. 351, 162 AtI.
829 (1933); Concrete Products Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 310 Pa.
x58, I65 At]. 492 (I933); Commonwealth v. Great American Indemnity Co., 312
Pa. 183, 167 Atl. 793 (i933).
20 See Corbin, Third Parties as Beneficiaries of Contractors' Surety Bonds (1928)
38 YALE L. J. i; Campbell, Protection of Laborers and Materialmen under Con-
struction Bonds (1935-36) 3 U. OF Cm. L. RBv. 1, 201.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CONTRACTS
has been over the legal operation of identical promissory language.
The Institute did not see fit to draft a rule that is specifically appli-
cable to these surety bonds, although such a bond that contains
an express promise to pay claims ought to be held to be within the
spirit and meaning of the Institute's general rules.
The laborers and materialmen are not exactly "creditors" of
the promisee (the owner), although in many cases they have a lien
on his property. They are creditors of a fourth party, the build-
ing contractor. These bonds are contracts in which A promises B
to pay a debt that C owes to D. Under a rule that enables D to
get judgment against A, we may regard D as both a creditor and
a donee; he is an intended donee of the security created by having
an enforceable right against A, although he is not a donee of the
money when A pays it. Also, he is a creditor of C in all cases; and
in many cases he can collect his debt by enforcing a lien against
the property of B, although he cannot get a personal judgment.
Judges and writers have at various times tried to justify the
giving of judgment to third-party beneficiaries on artificial theories
of subrogation, of agency, or of trusts, and to limit recovery to
those cases in which the chosen theory is clearly applicable.2 ' In
many cases, it is the plainest fiction to say that the facts of the
case are included within the category to which these theories have
previously been applied. Doubtless, it is often by bare-faced
fiction that the law changes and develops, to the benefit of the
community; the case under discussion is an excellent example of
such development. But there always comes a time when the
fiction should be recognized for what it is - a mere temporary
expedient; the social policy that induced the invention of the
fiction should be given more direct expression; and the limits of
application of the rule should be determined by such social policy
and not by the peculiar nature of the fiction. The Institute, while
not attempting to state any social policy as a reason for its rules,
21 Subrogation theory: Keller v. Ashford, 133 U. S. 61o (8go); Tamiami Inv.'
Co. v. Berk, 57 F.(2d) 1034 (C. C. A. 3d, 1932) (good dissent); McIlvane v.
Big Stony Lumber Co., io5 Va. 613, 54 S. E. 473 (i9o6) (a Virginia statute then
gave a "direct" right only to sole beneficiaries); see Whittier, Contract Bene-
ficiaries (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 790
Trustee theory: The use of this theory by the English courts is reviewed at
length by Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons (1930) 46 L. Q.
REv. 12.
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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
clearly recognizes that the rules that it states are not dependent
on theories of subrogation, of agency, or of trusts. Likewise it
purports to state rules of general law, not rules of" common law
or of "equity ", or of "admiralty ", or of the church.
If the Restatement has the influence that has been hoped for it,
and that in the present instance it seems to be haviiig, it should
greatly reduce litigation by wholly eliminating the question of
"privity" and the supposed requirement that consideration must
move" from the promisee ". There is plenty of cause for litigation
remaining in the matter of interpretation of the varying words used
by contractors and in answering the question whether the plain-
tiff is in fact a beneficiary within the ambit of the stated rules.
Such continuing litigation will, as a matter of course, slowly im-
pinge upon the form and content of the rules themselves, eventu-
ally requiring new critical research by scholars and new Restate-
ments by new Institutes.
The requirement as to "privity" and the development of the
law as to contracts for the benefit of third persons have followed
the same devious and often inconsistent course in the Supreme
Court of the United States as in the state courts. At various
stages, that Court has recognized the right of the third person
without discussion; 2 has asserted that the third person has an
enforceable right only when he is sole beneficiary; 2 has based a
creditor beneficiary's right on the doctrine of subrogation; 24 has
said that the third party's right created by a statutory surety bond
is enforceable both in equity and at law; 25 and very recently, in
a suit by a materialman on a contractor's surety bond given as
required by a state statute, the Court has said: " [the surety]
contracts directly with the sub-contractor to assure the satisfaction
of his just claims against the principal contractor. The remedy
for a breach of this undertaking is an action at law." 26 The Court
then held in this recent case that the right of the materialman is a
22 Newell v. Nixon, 4 Wall. 572 (U. S. 1866); Hendrick v. Lindsay, 93 U. S.
143 (1876).
23 National Bank v. Grand Lodge, 98 U. S. 123 (1878).
24 Keller v. Ashford, 133 U. S. 61o (i8go).
25 Illinois Surety Co. v. United States, 240 U. S. 2314 (iq96). And see Johns
v. Wilson, i8o U. S. 44o (igoi), enforcing a mortgagee beneficiary's claim by
applying the law of Arizona.
26 International Steel & Iron Co. v. National Surety Co., 297 U. S. 657, 664
(3936).
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24 Keller v. Ashford, 133 U. S. 610 (1890).
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CONTRACTS
contract right that is protected by the Constitution against impair-
ment by state legislation. There should be no quarrel with this
decision. The third party's right is a contract right even though
the contract that created it was not made with him. The material-
man was a "third party ", not a promisee; but the contract that
created his right was protected against impairment, so that his
right, as well as that of the promisee, was protected.
ASSIGNMENT OF RIGHTS
In other divisions of the law of contracts, there have been
changes in mode of analysis and in forms of expression without
any serious change in results actually reached. Thus, we may
now say that a contract right or other " chose in action " is assign-
able, whereas it was formerly said to be nonassignable "at com-
mon law ". ,Whatever justification there may have been for the
statement formerly made, the results actually reached by the
courts and the business practices affected thereby have not been
substantially changed. We are not now concerned with the exact
character of the changes that resulted from the joinder of law and
equity or from the adoption of new codes of procedure. It is
merely asserted that the ultimate juristic effect of an assignment
of a contract right has not been substantially changed even though
the procedure by which that effect is determined and the courts to
which it may be necessary to go have been much varied. The
statement of existing law, as now made by the American Law
Institute, could have been correctly made more than fifty years
ago.
As an example of the foregoing, we may consider the case of a
partial assignment. The right created in the assignee by such an
assignment was once enforceable in "equity" only, the purpose
of this limitation being the prevention of a multiplicity of separate
suits by a number of partial assignees. This desired end is
equally well attained in any modern court whose procedure is as
flexible as was that of the court of Chancery. The Institute de-
clares that the assignment of a fractional part is operative as to
that part to the same extent as is the assignment of an entire
claim. 7 This purports to be a statement of general law, and
27 See RESTATE NT, CONTRACTS (1932) § I56.
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there is no warning that it is not applicable in New Jersey, Tennes-
see, or other states maintaining a separate court of Chancery. Of
course, it is quite possible that this statement may not be true,
just as is the case with any other stated doctrine of the Institute
or of any single jurist working and writing in his separate cloister.
But the present writer will defend the statement.
Again, the Institute says that " rights under a bilateral contract
can be assigned as effectively as rights under a unilateral con-
tract ",2, a statement that seems to be in conflict with the stated
rules of former treatises and judicial opinions."3 This seeming
change is due only to a better analysis of jural relations. Under
the "restated" rule no more than under former ones can a party
get rid of his contractual duty by an attempted assignment or
,delegation. Further, if his contractual right to some performance
by the other party is conditional in any manner, he cannot by an
assignment make it unconditional; if his right is conditional upon
his own personal rendition of a return performance, the right of his
assignee will be subject to that identical condition.
By asserting that no substantial change in the law has been
made by the new wording of the rule, it is not meant to assert that
the new wording may not affect some actual decisions. The courts
were likely to be misled by the older forms of statement; but the
truth is that in spite of those forms the courts in general actually
reached the results that are reached under the new form. If this
is not true, the Institute was in error in adopting the new form.
IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFORMANCE
What has been said about assignment is also true of other parts
of contract law. Thus we once said that a person is not discharged
from his contractual duty by the fact that its performance
has since become impossible."0 But the concept of "impossi-
28 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § i61.
29 Thus, Sir Frederick Pollock wrote: ". . . rights arising out of contract can-
not be transferred if they are coupled with liabilities . . . ." PoLocK, CONTRACTS
(4th ed. i888) 425. This statement was quoted with approval in Arkansas Valley
Smelting Co. v. Belden Mining Co., 127 U. S. 379 (i888). Substantially similar
statements are to be found in other treatises and opinions.
30 See the dictum in Paradine v. Jane, Aleyn 26, 27 (1647), repeated literally
in many a modem treatise and court opinion. For the contradictory rule, see
RESTATFENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 457.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CONTRACTS
bility" has been submitted to further analysis, and more con-
sideration has been given to what it is that has become impossible.
This was required by the fact that new cases arose in which the
strict application of the rule as formerly expressed would give
dissatisfaction, the new analysis and the new wording (" restate-
ment ") being thus induced. This is, indeed, a development of law
and a change in expressed rules, an extremely important matter.
It seldom involves a conflict in actual decision. In the case of a
contract that promised the delivery of possession of a specific
building, the destruction of that building by fire was held to dis-
charge the promisor's duty, even when the rule as formerly stated
was not directly criticized." How easy it was to make the decision
turn upon the presumed intention of the parties! By a process of
"interpretation ", the promise was found to be conditional on the
continued existence of the building, a result reached without intro-
ducing evidence as to the exact words of the parties and in spite
of a high probability that the possibility of fire never entered their
minds.
By processes like this, " impossibility" becomes a defense and
an excuse from duty, in spite of statements that it is not. A clear
and accurate statement of the results now reached by the courts
requires many more sentences and paragraphs than were required
in earlier times. Earlier broad generalizations must be reformed
and reworded. Such expansion and development as this is not
identical with that which involves a right-about-face, in action as
well as in words, and the contrary decision of an identical issue.
In all branches of the law, the former development is much more
frequent than the latter; but both require the constant overhauling
of our legal system and the constant restatement of all of those
variable " working rules" of which any legal system is composed.
In dealing with the concept of impossibility, just as in dealing
with the more inclusive concept of conditions precedent to a duty
of immediate performance, the courts have given increasing con-
sideration to the extent of the risk that a promisor should be
regarded as having undertaken. In the performance of a con-
tract, risks are encountered that the parties did not foresee or
provide for. The court must then supply the gap and allocate
31 Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 B. & S. 826 (Q. B. 1863).
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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
the risks in accordance with reason - that is, in accordance with
custom, business practice, common feeling, the mores of the com-
munity. Often, these are not so plain that he who runs may read;
the court must be advised by evidence as well as argument.
This process is often inaccurately described as "interpretation"
of the contract; it is less misleading to describe it as the "con-
struction" of the contract, meaning thereby the determination by
the court of the legal operation of the contract along with that
of the facts that have occurred since its formation. The "inten-
tion of the parties ", as objectively expressed, is indeed an im-
portant and frequently the decisive element; but an intelligent
judge is aware that his function goes far beyond the ascertain-
ment of such intention.
The risk of objective impossibility, physical or legal in charac-
ter, is now seldom made to rest upon a promisor; and there is a
tendency to include under that head the occurrence of unexpected
circumstances involving extraordinary difficulty or expense. The
matter is one of degree; and the lines of risk allocation must be
determined by the courts as they write the mores into law in the
litigated cases that arise. The risk of mere personal and sub-
jective inability to perform a promise must still be borne by the
promisor, except so far as bankruptcy laws modify this risk and
afford limited relief by throwing it in part upon the promisee.
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION
Another illustration of this kind of development and restate-
ment is found in the law of accord and satisfaction. "Upon an
accord no remedy lies." So said Lord Chief Justice Eyre in
1794 .2 But the Contracts Restatement declares the exact con-
trary and indicates the several remedies that are available to both
creditor and debtor.3 The new rules stated by the Institute are
contrary to the actual decisions of very few cases in the last
several centuries. Seeing a good contract that ought to be en-
forced, the courts easily reached the desired result by calling the
executory agreement something other than "accord ". This
32 Lynn v. Bruce, 2 H. Bla. 317, 318 (Ex. 1794). This rule is repeated in (1914)
z C. J. 533-34, § 23; and again in (1936) 1 C. J. S. 543, § 38.
33 See § 417.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CONTRACTS
process muddles up the use of legal terms and their definitions;
it throws the stated law into confusion and renders it difficult for
a judge to apply and for a student to learn and understand. It
necessitates new analysis, new definition, and a " Restatement ".
A journey further back into the law of accord and satisfaction
will expose the other type of development and change. An accord
executory is in almost all cases a bilateral agreement: each party
makes a promise of some future performance. In the earlier cen-
turies of English law, bilateral agreements seem not to have been
enforced in the King's courts. As long as they were not enforced,
it was correct to say that "upon an accord no remedy lies ", pro-
vided that the accord was a bilateral one. The recognition and
enforcement of bilateral agreements represented a major variation
in the actual decision of issues. So far as concerns accord and
satisfaction, no such change as this has occurred in the last fifty
years, or several hundred.
AGREEMENTS TO SUSPEND A RIGHT or ACTION
An interesting example of the halting and unsatisfactory man-
ner in which law develops may be found in the cases dealing with
promises by a creditor not to sue his debtor for some limited time.
It is not doubted that such a promise may be an enforceable con-
tract; the problem is as to the legal effect of such a contract upon
the enforceability of the creditor's prior claim. The well-known
case of Ford v. Beech raises this problem, along with certain
others. The facts were as follows: William Beech was indebted to
Ford on two notes amounting to £340. After their maturity, it
was agreed by Ford, William Beech, and one Alfred Beech, that
Alfred should pay either the sum of £2oo in trust for Elizabeth
Beech or an annuity of £25 per year in quarterly installments, and
that the rights of Ford against William Beech should be sus-
pended so long as Alfred punctually performed his promise to
make such payments. Alfred performed his promise to pay the
annuity, although Ford thought the contrary; and this perform-
ance by Alfred was pleaded as a defense in a suit by Ford on
William's two notes. The Court of Queen's Bench held that the
34 Ford v. Beech. ix Q. B. 852 (Ex. 1848).
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plea stated a good defense; but this judgment against Ford was
reversed in the Exchequer Chamber.
The upper court appealed to the ancient rule that "the right to
bring a personal action, once existing and by act of the party sus-
pended for ever so short a time, is extinguished and discharged,
and can never revive "."' Since it was obvious that Ford had never
expressed an intention to discharge the debt of William Beech
until the promise of Alfred should be performed in full, the court
held that there was no suspension and no defense on the notes. It
said, however, that the "agreement may give the defendant [Wil-
liam] a claim to damages by reason of the plaintiff suing in breach
of it ,.36
Before the Exchequer Chamber rendered final judgment, Wil-
liam and Alfred Beech brought a bill in Chancery, asking for
specific enforcement of Ford's promise of suspension. The Vice-
Chancellor, after final judgment had been rendered, entered a de-
cree against Ford for specific performance of his promise, enjoin-
ing him from enforcing execution against William Beech on
condition that Alfred should pay £200 to Elizabeth Beech, and
ordering the cancellation of the notes after such payment."
From these two decisions, it appears that the legal operation of
the agreement in the Court of Exchequer was different from its
operation in Chancery. What should be said to be its legal opera-
tion in the courts of the United States, especially in those juris-
dictions where there has been such a joinder of common law' and
equity that there is only one system of courts acting in accordance
with a uniform procedure? The American Law Institute answers
this question by declaring that such an agreement "bars an
action . . . during the agreed time ".8 This is an abandonment
of the common-law rule that a right of action could not be sus-
pended for an instant without suffering complete extinction. Such
an agreement now does what the parties have declared that it
should do.
The specific agreement in the foregoing case was made for the
35 11 Q. B. at 867.
36 Id. at 866.
37 Beech v. Ford, 7 Hare 2o8 (Ch. 1848).
38 R.STATEadENT, CoNTRACTs (1932) §409, with specific reference also to
§ 417, stating the law of accord and satisfaction.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CONTRACTS
benefit of four separate parties, their jural relations under modern
law being as follows: (i) William Beech's duty of immediate pay-
ment of the two notes was terminated, there being substituted a
duty of future payment conditional on Alfred's failure to keep his
promise. (2) To Elizabeth Beech (or in trust for her) the sums
promised by Alfred Beech were to be paid. (3) Ford himself
obtained a new security in the promise of Alfred Beech to pay
either £200 or a continuing annuity of £25 to Elizabeth in dis-
charge of Ford's previous claim for £34o against William Beech.
The agreement was both a contract not to sue for a specified time
and an accord executory providing for the future total discharge
of an existing claim by a substituted performance to be rendered
by a new party. (4) Alfred Beech obtained the object for which
he contracted, viz., a right that Ford should not sue William. It
is the promise of Ford that is beneficial to William and Alfred,
although its performance is directly beneficial to William alone.
It is the promise of Alfred that is beneficial to Elizabeth Beech
and Ford, although its performance is directly beneficial to Eliza-
beth alone. It should be observed that the legal operation of a
promise must first be determined before the promise, regarded
apart from its performance, can be said to be beneficial to anybody.
William Beech is benefited, in that if he is sued by Ford on the
notes, he has a good defense as long as there has been no breach by
Alfred. A suit against him during this period would be dismissed,
without prejudice to a subsequent suit after a failure of perform-
ance by Alfred. Further, full performance by Alfred of either
alternative stated in the new agreement will completely terminate
William's duty to Ford. These benefits accrue to William in spite
of the fact that he gave no consideration for them; it is Alfred who
is paying for them. If William is regarded as a promisee in the
new agreement, Ford's promise not to sue on the notes being a
promise made to both William and Alfred, then William is both a
donee beneficiary and a promisee beneficiary.39 If William was
not in fact a promisee, then he is a third-party (and donee) bene-
ficiary. It seems not to have occurred to the Vice-Chancellor that
the law of England " knows nothing of a jus quaesitum tertio aris-
39 Vice-Chancellor Wigram said, "although William was not a party to the
agreement, it is admitted that it was made with his privity, and he has a distinct
interest in seeking that it may be enforced." 7 Hare at 216.
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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
ing by way of contract ,.o He had plenty of precedent for his
assumption that the contrary was then sound law and equity in
England; " and there is no doubt that his decision is in accord-
ance with the generally prevailing law in the United States.42
Elizabeth Beech is plainly a donee beneficiary of the perform-
ance promised by Alfred Beech; and'as such she could maintain
suit for the enforcement of the promise. The money was to be
paid to her (or in trust for her). Ford and Alfred Beech, having
made mutual promises to each other (a bilateral contract), of
course have the usual rights and remedies that are created by such
a contract.
The question might arise whether William Beech, in addition
to his rights and privileges as against Ford, does not also get an
enforceable right against Alfred that the latter shall perform his
promise to Ford. Alfred's faithful performance is certainly of
great value to William; and his breach of promise would injure
William by at once renewing Ford's right of action on the notes.
Nevertheless, it may be that the courts are not yet ready to hold
that Alfred's promise was made "for the benefit of" William.
Alfred has laid himself open to actions by Ford and Elizabeth;
perhaps a third action would seem to be one too many.
It is perfectly clear that under modern procedure, just as for-
merly in equity, the entire transaction and the legal relations of all
four parties can and should be adjudicated in a single suit (assum-
ing the possibility of service of process). The modern court can
do exactly what Vice-Chancellor Wigram did; and it can do it in
a suit exactly like that brought by Ford against William Beech on
40 The quotation is from Lord Haldane's opinion in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre
Co. v. Selfridge & Co., [i915 A. C. 847, 853.
41 The English cases are reviewed in Corbin, supra note 21. The case of
Tweddle v. Atkinson, x B. & S. 393 (Q. B. i86i), was still to come, and then at
common law only.
42 That a third-party beneficiary can get, not only an enforceable right against
a promisor, but also a legal privilege of not performing his former duty (i.e., a
defense), is expressly recognized by the Law Institute, in §405, illustration i:
"A owes B a matured debt of $ioo. B assigns his right to C, receiving in re-
turn C's promise not to sue A for one year. C cannot maintain an action against
A before the end of the year." This is on all fours with Baurer v. Devenis, 99
Conn. 203, 121 Atl. 566 (1923). The juristic rights and privileges of William should
be regarded as being derived from both common law and equity, if the question
of their derivation makes any difference under modern American law.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CONTRACTS
the latter's two notes. William could plead his defense, and stop
there if he so desired. Alfred could intervene voluntarily, or could
be brought in against his will. Ford and Elizabeth could sepa-
rately or jointly get a decree for specific performance against
Alfred. Neither Alfred nor William would need an injunction
against Ford, unless Ford is suing in another jurisdiction. Ford
could get a decree enforcing Alfred's promise as an accord execu-
tory, or could get judgment against William for the amount of the
notes if the court is unable (or is not asked) to make Alfred pay.
Does the foregoing demonstrate a development of the law of
contracts? In the main, it indicates a development in the pro-
cedure of courts, but the recognition and enforcement of contract
rights often depends directly upon an understanding of the
changes that have occurred in courts and their procedure. The
juristic operation of the agreement between Ford and Alfred
Beech as recognized in the court of Chancery is now its juristic
operation under our unified system of law in practically all of our
courts. This is recognized in the doctrines adopted by the Law
Institute. One of the beneficial functions of that body, of which
it may not always be aware, and one which some of its critics may
not have observed, is the open abandonment of old doctrines that
for any reason have become obsolete or inaccurate, and the re-
statement of new ones as required by judicial decisions or by the
reorganization of court systems and procedure.
Not all modern courts have clearly recognized the juristic im-
plications of the foregoing development of court powers and pro-
cedure; it may be only a fraction of the bar who are sufficiently
aware of it to render efficient service to their clients. This may be
illustrated by the case of Reilly v. Barrett,43 not yet twenty years
old.
The plaintiff in this case sued in a tort action for damages. The
defendant denied the tort; and in a supplemental answer alleged
that an agreement was made, whereby he promised to pay $200
and the plaintiff promised to receive that sum in full satisfaction
and that he had tendered payment of the money. The court sus-
tained a demurrer to this supplemental answer. It should not have
done so. As the court said, the agreement was an accord executory
43 20 N2 . Y. 170, ix5 N. E. 453 (I917).
:19371
HeinOnline -- 50 Harv. L. Rev. 471 1936-1937
1 ] T EVEW TS 471
tt r's . i l is ,
r if . l r l e l t ril , l
r ght i inst is li eth l -
t l j intly t cific r ance ainst
. it er r illia tion
i st i i ti .
l t i 's i r
, l j e t i t i t e t
t t r ) t .
t t
t t t
t , iti t tract
t t t ing
ti t
i t i ti
i ll
t
. e efici l
,
, t t









2 . . , !I . .453 (1917).
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
and not itself a satisfaction of the tort claim; but the court was in
error when it said: "An accord, when followed by satisfaction,
is a bar to the assertion of the original claim. Until so followed it
has no effect." " The New York court was a statutory court, with
both equity and common-law powers, with the duty of applying
equity rules where they differ from the common law, and with a
flexible procedure enabling it to recognize defenses and to give all
forms of relief appropriate to the case. It should have held that
the accord was a perfectly valid bilateral contract, operating as
a suspension of the plaintiff's right of action and specifically en-
forceable in the very action that had been brought. The court
should have overruled the demurrer; and later, in case the agree-
ment and tender were proved, should have given judgment for the
defendant, conditional on payment of $200 into court. If the de-
fendant argued that the agreement was itself a final discharge of
the tort claim, he was in error; but this does not justify the court
in sustaining the demurrer and proceeding with the enforcement
of that claim. Apparently, the court still held the view that the
agreement was not an enforceable contract, that "upon an accord
no remedy lies ".
CHANGING MoRFS AND SANCTITY OF CONTRACT
Some of the developments above described may be regarded as
striking and important changes in the law of contracts. But they
are neither so striking nor so important as are changes in the
social mores that form the basis of all law and the ultimate source
from which legal generalizations and judicial opinions are drawn.
No attempt will here be made to enumerate and describe these
changes in the social mores with any definiteness or certainty. A
few suggestions may be attempted as to their character, as to their
causes, and as to the particular parts of the stated law that they
are likely to affect. Such changes cannot be enumerated and
described without an experience in the lives and opinions of men
and an extended research into myriads of transactions beyond the
capacity of any writer. Assuredly, the present writer has made
no such research and has had no such experience.
44 22o N. Y. at 173, 115 N. E. at 454.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CONTRACTS
Many persons believe, sometimes regretfully and sometimes
with satisfaction, that in very recent times there has been a serious
decline in respect for the obligation of contract and a growing con-
viction that the breaking of promises is socially just and right,
when their performance or enforcenient involves hardship or a
substantially greater effort and sacrifice than was anticipated by
the promisor when the contract was made. Has not our own
Government effectually repudiated its solemnly attested promises
to repay borrowed money in gold? Has it not, by enacted legis-
lation, attempted to prevent the performance of similar promises
by private individuals? Is not the breaking of national promises
now generally regarded as justifiable international policy? Do
the members of college faculties regard themselves as bound by a
contract of service with the college? Are labor unions and the
members of labor unions justified in striking for better wages and
conditions in spite of a contract with their employer? Is the re-
pudiation of a contract justified by the fact that one of the con-
tractors had greater economic power than the other?
It may be that there has been less change in these matters than
is commonly supposed. Such change as there has been is without
doubt the result of the destruction of wealth, business depression,
and economic hardship. It may well be that the depression and
hardship will pass before there has been time to write the change
in popular attitude into statutes and judicial opinions. But it is
certain that the change will be so written, if the prevailing senti-
ment of the community continues to support it. There would thus
result a change in contract law much more fundamental and far-
reaching than any of the changes in theories of mutual assent,
consideration, or third-party beneficiaries. It does not neces-
sarily follow that such a fundamental change would work well; in-
stead, it might even accelerate the destruction of wealth and add
to the general economic hardship that caused it.
It must be recognized that both popular mores and judicial de-
cisions have long justified the nonperformance of many contracts
for a variety of reasons. We have had discharge in bankruptcy
without consent of creditors; and we have had contractual duties
limited by the court under a flimsy disguise of "interpretation ",
when the court was really creating constructive conditions and
excuses from duty on grounds of supposed social policy and "fair-
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ness ". If there has been new relaxation in the theory of sanctity
of contract, the difference is merely one of degree. The pendulum
has merely swung farther to the left before it makes its necessary
return movement to the right.
CHANGING MORES AND LIBERTY OF CONTRACT
This article does not undertake to state all the changes or to
indicate all the major developments in the law of contracts during
the past fifty years. Changes started within that period are still in
progress; and their results are as yet impossible of dogmatic re-
statement. With respect to "illegal bargains ", where is now the
line separating the lawful from the unlawful, particularly in the
field of contracts in restraint of trade? Old doctrines have suf-
fered from the impacts of war, depression, and legislation. The
NIRA has left scars, even though declared unconstitutional. It
revived old practices and started new ones. New notions as to
what makes for the general welfare have made headway; their
soundness is still in process of testing and their survival is in the
balance. It will be for the courts to amalgamate what is good in
the new with what remains of the old; and it can hardly be sup-
posed that this will not compel some restatement of the law in
matters of importance.
The evolution of law proceeds by a constant struggle, between
individuals or groups of individuals, for rights and privileges; that
is, for the aid of the social organization against others and for its
forbearance from interference against ourselves, for protection
and for liberty. Each would like to have utter freedom of compe-
tition for himself - unlimited privileges of procuring the satis-
faction of his own desires; and at the same time each desires
extensive limitations on the freedom of competition by others for
the objects of desire. " Law" is the resultant of this struggle.
We are compelled to barter away some privileges in order to gain
some rights; and human action is thereby divided into the "law-
ful" and the "unlawful ", the permitted and the forbidden.
It is in this setting that the concept of "liberty of contract"
must be examined. Each one would like to be free to make such
bargains as he pleases; but he must surrender a part of that free-
dom if he desires that others should surrender a part of theirs.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CONTRACTS
Thus the making of certain bargains becomes unlawful - for-
bidden. Again, each one would like to have the aid of society in
the enforcement of such bargains as he pleases to make; but he
is not willing that others should have such aid in the enforcement
of all of their bargains. Therefore, he must be content that cer-
tain bargains shall give him no rights in order that others also shall
have none.
Since the evolution of law is struggle and compromise, no sys-
tem of law can ever be static or definitely knowable. The law is
not "a brooding omnipresence in the sky ". Therefore, the lines
that separate lawful bargains from the unlawful, the lines that
separate criminal bargains from those that are only tortious, as
well as from those that are only unenforceable, are always blurred
and variable. There are no lines, but only zones with fringes.
The struggle is a continuing struggle; the compromise is con-
stantly renewed. Legislatures as well as courts constantly take
a hand in constructing new lines and distinctions. The practices
of business, and even the fundamental mores that are the source
of our notions of "right and wrong" are in constant process of
evolution. Our beliefs as to what general welfare and "public
policy" require are confused and inharmonious.45
Arthur L. Corbin.
YALE SCHOOL OF LAw.
45 The preceding three paragraphs are in large part taken from an introductory
note to Chapter i2 of the present writer's CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (2d ed.
1933), copyrighted by the West Publishing Company. It should be perfectly obvi-
ous that in these paragraphs. the writer is not discussing the question of con-
stitutional power of courts or legislatures to deprive individuals of the privilege
of making contracts or of their power to make enforceable ones. It is here the
underlying assumption, justified by the long history of the common law, that such
power exists in both courts and legislatures. There may, of course, he constitu-
tional limits on that power; but this paper is not a commentary on progress in
constitutional interpretation or in political theory. See Pound, Liberty of Contract
(I9O9) x8 YALE L. J. 454.
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